haseeb1111 JELLYJELLY +203% Anatomy: Why the Copy Trade Doesn't Survive the Settlement

On March 26, 2025, a trader identified as haseeb1111 showed a +203% position on JELLYJELLY perps via Hyperliquid. The haseeb1111 JELLYJELLY +203% anatomy breaks down fast: three coordinated wallets pre-positioned before the squeeze, drove JELLY's spot price up roughly 250% intraday, force-liquidated a $4.1M short into Hyperliquid's HLP vault, and briefly pushed the vault to a $12M unrealized loss. The attacking side's peak unrealized gain hit $8.2M. Then Hyperliquid's validators voted to delist JELLY and force-settle all positions at $0.0095, far below the ~$0.50 oracle price.

The copy trade fails at step one. Entry was pre-spike. Exit required precision into a thin order book that closed in minutes, not hours. Anyone who saw the screenshot and tried to follow in was already too late.

JELLYJELLY has since shed more than 60% of its post-spike value. The $8.2M unrealized gain was never real money for any late entrant. Here's the full anatomy.

How the Squeeze Was Built: The Four-Day Setup

The JELLYJELLY attack on March 26, 2025 didn't begin on March 26, 2025. In the four days before the incident, seven coordinated wallets withdrew roughly 20% of JELLY's circulating supply from Gate.io and Bitget. Yahoo Finance reported that "Shortly after these CEX withdrawals, JELLYJELLY jumped +600%." That withdrawal tightened the spot order book deliberately, setting conditions for a price move that required minimal capital to execute.

On March 26, wallet 0xde9 opened a $4.1M short on JELLYJELLY perps via Hyperliquid. Wallets 0x20e and 0x67f simultaneously opened longs worth $2.15M and $1.9M respectively, per Arkham Research's post-incident documentation. The long positions drove spot price up. The short hit its liquidation threshold and force-liquidated into Hyperliquid's HLP vault, the community-funded market-making pool that auto-absorbs liquidations.

Binance listed a 25x JELLYJELLY perp the same day. Protos reported that the coincidence triggered accusations that CEXs were enabling a directed assault on Hyperliquid's vault. JELLYJELLY's market cap touched roughly $500M at the peak.

The structural vulnerability that OAK Research identified is specific: Hyperliquid's HLP vault auto-absorbs liquidations, creating an attack surface when the listed asset has a thin spot float. Low-float meme tokens aren't accidents of selection. They're the vector.

The $12M Vault Hole and the $0.0095 Settlement

When the $4.1M short force-liquidated into HLP, the vault momentarily sat on a $12M unrealized loss. Hyperliquid's validators voted to delist JELLY and force-settle all positions at $0.0095, well below the ~$0.50 oracle price at the time of the vote.

That settlement price sounds catastrophic for HLP. It wasn't. Because the short had been absorbed below market and the forced settlement price undercut the vault's cost basis, HLP closed its 24-hour window with approximately $700,000 USDC profit, according to INCRYPTED's post-incident analysis.

The attacking trader's side tells a different story. Peak unrealized gain: $8.2M. Realized gain after forced settlement at $0.0095: functionally zero for anyone who didn't exit before the validator vote. Protos noted that "individual traders can actually liquidate market-makers if collateral ratios fall below specified thresholds." But the reverse is also true: market-makers can reprice their exit unilaterally.

Haseeb Qureshi, managing partner at Dragonfly Capital, explained the structural dynamic on The Chopping Block Ep. 854: "Users want lottery tickets aligned with group wins -- that's the structural demand DEX perps are catering to, and it's also why HLP-style vaults end up holding the bag."

HLP held the bag for about eight hours. Then validators voted their way out of it.

Why the haseeb1111 JELLYJELLY +203% Can't Be Copied

The haseeb1111 JELLYJELLY +203% anatomy has three non-transferable conditions. Every one of them was gone before the screenshot circulated.

Pre-spike entry. The positions opened before the 250% spot pump. Anyone reading a +203% screenshot was looking at a trade that had already completed most of its move.

Position sizing for thin liquidity. The $2.15M and $1.9M positions worked because those sizes could exit into the available order book. Scale either position 2x or 3x and the exit itself crashes the price. The JELLYJELLY order book on March 26 wasn't deep enough for copycats.

The oracle-spot gap closes fast. The mechanism was the gap between Hyperliquid's oracle price (~$0.50) and the spot price being driven by the attackers' own purchases. That gap is the trade. It exists for minutes. By the time the story hit Crypto Twitter, the gap had resolved or been force-settled.

For traders running copy strategies without automated exits, see what happened here: a position that showed +203% became a forced settlement at $0.0095 for latecomers. AO Shadow automates trailing exits so positions close at the signal, not when you check your phone. That's the structural answer to exactly this failure mode.

Haseeb Qureshi's broader lesson from this incident, and from the similarly structured haseeb1111 M +287% anatomy: treat any newly listed memecoin perp as a manipulation target for the first 72 hours. Don't follow the screenshot. Understand the exit mechanics before the entry.

JELLYJELLY vs. Earlier Vault Exploits: What the Pattern Shows

Incident	Date	Attack Vector	Attacker Peak PnL	Settlement	Protocol Outcome
Mango Markets	Oct 2022	Oracle manipulation, undercollateralized borrow	~$114M	Governance vote + attacker negotiation	~$114M drained
GMX adversarial flow	2023-2024	Large directional trades vs. thin GLP pool	Not disclosed	Protocol fee changes	GLP pool drawdowns
JELLYJELLY / Hyperliquid	Mar 26, 2025	Low-float spot pump, short force-liquidated into HLP	$8.2M unrealized	Validator vote, $0.0095 forced settlement	$12M peak loss, recovered to +$700K USDC

The pattern across all three: exploit the gap between oracle price and thin spot liquidity, force a protocol-level counterparty to absorb the position, exit before the protocol responds. JELLYJELLY was the first incident where a meme token with thin spot float was the specific vector. OAK Research's analysis documented the vulnerability architecture in full.

The Mango Markets governance resolution took days. Hyperliquid's validator vote took hours. That speed is either a feature or a centralization signal, depending on what you think "decentralized" means.

The Decentralization Question Hyperliquid Still Hasn't Answered

When Hyperliquid's validators voted to settle JELLY at $0.0095 against an oracle price of ~$0.50, they saved the vault. The debate has run through Q1-Q2 2026 without a clean resolution.

INCRYPTED's analysis called it directly: the validator vote raised "questions of decentralization" that Hyperliquid couldn't sidestep. Funds at Dragonfly now treat DEX perp vault exposure as a distinct risk category whenever a low-float token gets listed. That's the institutional response to the structural vulnerability, not a scandal.

For traders holding positions through a validator-overrideable settlement: "decentralized" means decentralized until the vault is at risk. That's not a complaint. It's a fact pattern you need to price in.

FAQ

What happened with haseeb1111's JELLYJELLY +203% trade on Hyperliquid?

On March 26, 2025, a coordinated attack drove JELLY's spot price up roughly 250%, force-liquidating a $4.1M short into the HLP vault. The attacking side showed a peak unrealized gain of $8.2M. Hyperliquid's validators force-settled all positions at $0.0095, far below the ~$0.50 oracle price. The +203% was pre-spike entry. Followers arrived after the move had already run.

Why can't copy traders replicate the JELLYJELLY +203% trade?

The JELLYJELLY trade required pre-spike entry, position sizing small enough to exit into thin liquidity, and an oracle-vs-spot gap that closes in minutes. By the time any screenshot circulated, all three conditions were gone. JELLYJELLY also lost more than 60% of its post-spike value, meaning late entrants were force-settled at $0.0095 with no recovery path.

What is HLP and why did it matter in the JELLYJELLY attack?

HLP is Hyperliquid's community-funded liquidity vault designed to auto-absorb forced liquidations. When the $4.1M short was liquidated, HLP owned the position involuntarily. That's the attack surface: force a large position into a vault that can't cleanly exit thin-market assets. HLP peaked at a $12M unrealized loss before the validator settlement returned it to approximately $700,000 USDC profit.

Was Binance involved in the JELLYJELLY Hyperliquid attack?

Binance listed a 25x JELLYJELLY perp the same day as the Hyperliquid squeeze. Protos reported that the timing triggered accusations of CEX coordination against Hyperliquid's vault. Whether the listing was coordinated or opportunistic was not proven, but the structural effect was real: a high-leverage venue for JELLY appeared the same day the attack ran.

Is Hyperliquid actually decentralized?

The validator vote to force-settle JELLY at $0.0095, overriding the ~$0.50 oracle price, is the evidence most cited against a "yes." Validators acted to protect vault solvency, which is what any clearinghouse does. Whether that qualifies as decentralized depends on your definition. Any DEX with a validator-overrideable settlement will use it when vault solvency is threatened.

If meme perp PnL screenshots have you rethinking your exit strategy, that instinct is right. The JELLYJELLY settlement wiped out late entrants who had no automated exit. AO Shadow automates position management for free, so your crypto trades close when the signal fires, not when you happen to check your phone. That's the fix for exactly what failed on March 26.